

North Korea's Recent "Nuclear Diplomacy" and Newly Emerging Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific Region*

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organized by

China Arms Control and Disarmament Association

Development Research Center of the State Council
People's Republic of China

* Paper for presentation at the international symposium on "Nuclear Issue in the Korean Peninsula and Security of Northeast Asia Region," October 22-23, 2004, Beijing, China. The views expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not represent the Japan Defense Agency or the Government of Japan.

1. Six-Party Talks at a Crossroad

The North Korean nuclear problem seems to come to a impasse in June 2004 third round of six-party talks held in Beijing. The United States, in the talks, set out its proposals for what North Korea would receive in exchange for the “complete and speedy dismantling of its nuclear programs.” North Korea under the U.S. plan has to meet several conditions during an initial three-month period. These include providing a full accounting of its weapons systems, granting the United States access to its nuclear operations, allowing for monitoring, and disabling some of its more dangerous weapons. During the same period, North Korea, a country hungry for energy would receive heavy fuel oil from Japan and South Korea, along with a provisional agreement that the United States would not attack North Korea. Washington would also start reviewing North Korea’s longer-term energy needs and the sanctions imposed. Subsequently, the United States would offer an extended security assurance, as North Korea moves to dismantling all its plutonium- and uranium-based nuclear weapons programs. It would also pledge that it would not backslide on the agreement.¹

Responding to U.S. proposals, North Korea actually came to find “some common elements,” but the proposals, according to the North Korean delegation, were “little new.” Yet the international community speculated that six-party talks

¹ “U.S. Shows Flexibility in Nuclear Talks: Facing Criticism in Asia for a Rigid Stance toward North Korea, Officials outline a Complex Proposal for Pyongyang to End its Arms Program,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 24, 2004.

were inching toward a peaceful solution. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs evaluated the third round as follows: The six parties found common ground in their understandings and proposals in the sense that focus is given to first steps towards unclear dismantlement. Based upon this evaluation, the third round of the six-party talks "laid a useful basis for further discussions."²

A week later, at an annual meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Jakarta, the foreign ministers of all ARF participating countries "took note positively" that the third round of six-party talks was held and agreed to convene the next round. And the chairman's statement highlighted that the ministers "supported the parties' commitments to the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and underlined the need to take first steps towards that goal as soon as possible".³

Washington and Pyongyang, however, still have a long way to go. At the end of July 2004, a spokesman for Pyongyang's Foreign Ministry officially rejected the proposal that the United States proposed at the third round. "In a word, the U.S. proposal is, in its essence, a mode of forcing Libya to scrap its nuclear program first, a mode veiled with the word 'landmark'," he said.⁴ North Korea therefore "considers the U.S. 'landmark proposal' to be little worthy to be considered any longer," according to the spokesman. On August 16, North Korea accused again

² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Third Round of Six-Party Talks Concerning North Korean Nuclear Issues," June 27, 2004. Available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/talk0406.html>

³ "Chairman's Statement: the Eleventh Meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum," Jakarta, Indonesia, July 2, 2004. Available at <<http://www.aseansec.org/16245.htm>>

⁴ "North Korea Rejects U.S. Nuclear Proposal," *Yonhap English News*, July 27, 2004.

the United States of “destroying the foundation” of six-party talks, claiming that it cannot attend the talks if the United States continues to retain its “hostile” policy toward North Korea.⁵

The U.S. government does not consider that these words constitute a formal declaration of North Korea’s intention, and is persistently asking the country to accept the proposal by the next round. But the *raison d’être* of the six-party talks would be questioned unless North Korea becomes willing to proceed to a denuclearization by the next round. The “ball” had already been thrown to Pyongyang by this comprehensive proposal the United States offered at the last talks, and the discussion now focuses on how Pyongyang would throw it back to Washington and international community.

This paper attempts to analyze North Korea’s “second nuclear diplomacy” started at the end of 2002, especially focusing on its intentions and capabilities to develop its nuclear weapons programs, and the international environment of the “second nuclear diplomacy.” Two levels of policy measures-the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and six-party talks- are now emerging. Significance of this development is that the convergent of these measures could lead to a paradigm shift in the security of Asia-Pacific region. The best response to North Korea’s nuclear problems ought to be fashioned in this context.

⁵ “N. Korea Accuses U.S. of Destroying Foundation of Six-Party Talks,” *Yonhap English News*, August 16, 2004.

2. North Korea's "Second Nuclear Diplomacy":

Its Intentions and Capabilities⁶

"Nuclear Deterrent Force" as a Policy Option

North Korea has set in motion its "second nuclear diplomacy," following its "first nuclear diplomacy" of 1993–94, by announcing in December 2002 that it had been resuming the operation and construction of the nuclear facilities, and on January 10, 2003 that it would withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Since this latter announcement, North Korea has taken provocative actions in a rapid succession. In February 2003, it also announced that were economic sanctions imposed on North Korea, it would abandon the obligations it had assumed under the 1953 Armistice Agreement. A MiG-19 fighter flew over the Northern Limit Line (NLL) that served as the quasi-maritime border between the two Koreas, and North Korea fired an anti-ship missile toward the Sea of Japan. In March, four North Korean fighters, including two MiG-29s, approached a U.S. RC-135S reconnaissance aircraft then flying over the Sea of Japan and tried to force it to land in the North Korean territory. On March 7, it announced that its nuclear facilities had already resumed operation, and three days later it once again fired an anti-ship missile toward the Sea of Japan. Finally, North Korea suggested in the following month that it might attack Japan with

⁶ See for example, "North Korea's 'Second Nuclear Diplomacy'—Rising Risks and Expectations," The National Institute for Defense Studies ed., *East Asian Strategic Review 2004*, Tokyo: The Japan Times, 2004, pp. 11-30.

ballistic missiles, warning “Japan is also within the striking range of North Korea.”

Most of these actions were either a reenactment of, or had features in common with, those it had taken in the past. For instance, the withdrawal from the NPT announced in January 2003 mirrored its behavior in pulling out of the treaty in March 1993, while the firing of anti-ship missiles toward the Sea of Japan in February and March 2003 was a repeat of the missile-firing exercise it carried out in May and June 1994. The threat of launching a ballistic missile in April 2003 was a repeat of its missile diplomacy of 1998–2000.

However, North Korea’s current nuclear diplomacy has a different design from that pursued previously in that North Korea for the first time publicly characterized its possession of “nuclear deterrent force” as a policy option and began using nuclear weapons testing as a bargaining chip. In the 1990s, North Korea had persistently claimed that it had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, and kept on denying that it was developing them. This time around, however, it showed no sign of concealing its nuclear development program. In April 2003, North Korea broadcasted that “Only the physical deterrent force, tremendous military deterrent force powerful enough to decisively beat back an attack supported by any ultra-modern weapons, can prevent war and safeguard the nation. This is a lesson drawn from the Iraqi war,” and asserted that it had the right

to possess a “nuclear deterrent force.”⁷ On April 18, North Korea declared that “we are successfully reprocessing more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at the final phase.” On April 30, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry released a statement that “the United States is stifling North Korea with physical force and the North cannot help but equip itself with the necessary deterrent force against such threats.”⁸ And on June 9, North Korea declared, “if the United States does not abandon its anti-DPRK policy and continues to threaten the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by nuclear weapons, the DPRK will have no choice but to seek nuclear deterrent force.”⁹

The Strengthened North Korea’s “Nuclear Card”

In addition to Pyongyang’s strong intentions to seek nuclear deterrent force, its “nuclear cards” have been strengthened. Pyongyang has made progress in the development of nuclear weapons. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the central components of its nuclear program—the production, extraction, and accumulation of plutonium—were frozen. However, as the freeze did not cover the development of a detonator, the miniaturization of warheads (or nuclear devices), and the development of delivery means, it is believed that North Korea has continued its efforts on these projects even after 1994. If North Korea succeeds in the

⁷ “N.K. Vows not to Respect Security Council Decision On its Nukes,” *Yonhap English News*, April 6, 2003.

⁸ “N.K. Ready to Use Force Against U.S. Threat: Pyongyang Spokesman,” *Yonhap English News*, April 30, 2003.

⁹ “DPRK Admits Seeking Nuclear Deterrent Force” *Xinhua*, June 9, 2003.

miniaturization, it would have serious ramifications because it means these can be mounted on ballistic missiles.¹⁰

In addition to the plutonium-based nuclear development it already has undertaken, North Korea is pressing ahead with the development of enriched uranium-based nuclear weapons. If it proceeds with a uranium enrichment program at its current pace, the plant could become fully operational as early as the middle of this decade, and it could produce “two or more nuclear weapons per year” according to a CIA estimate.¹¹

Furthermore, North Korea has made progress in developing long-range ballistic missiles that can be used as a delivery vehicle. In the second half of the 1990s, it began deploying No Dong missiles with a range of 1,300 kilometers. At present, North Korea’s arsenal of No Dong ballistic missiles is closer to 200 of reaching most parts of Japanese territory except for Okinawa than the 100 the North has been believed to have held so far, Japanese broadcaster NHK reported quoting a U.S. Army source.¹² It also is believed that No Dong missiles are designed to accommodate nuclear warheads, conventional warheads, cluster bombs, and chemical warheads. No dong, as is the case of Scuid, is thought to be loaded on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and operated with mobility.¹³

¹⁰ See, Nicholas D. Kristof, “Grabbing the Nettle The,” *New York Times*, August 1, 2003; “ROK Media React to CIA’s ‘Discovery’ of DPRK’s ‘New Nuclear Testing Site’,” *FBIS-EAS*, July 3, 2003.


¹¹ “U.S. Quietly Prepares to Negotiate with N. Korea: Hard Line Expected to Soften in Deal to Verifiably End Nuclear Program,” *USA Today*, December 3, 2002.

¹² “Yonhap Cites US ‘Army Source’: DPRK Possesses ‘Closer to’ 200 than 100 No Dong Missiles,” *FBIS-EAS*, April 17, 2003.

¹³ Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2003*, Tokyo: Inter Group Corporation, 2003, p. 49.

Therefore, a preemptive strike cannot be effective. Because Japan and the United States are not capable of neutralizing No Dong missiles deployed by North Korea, Tokyo, like Seoul, is being held hostage militarily, increasing Japan’s vulnerability.¹⁴

Regional Ballistic Missile Threat by North Korea



Source: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/ne_asia.html>

¹⁴ Japan’s Security Council and cabinet endorsed on December 19, 2003 a plan to introduce a “missile defense shield” to deal chiefly with the possibility of ballistic missile attacks from North Korea. Japan’s Defense Agency estimates “700 billion yen will be needed for the entire missile system in a five-year period.” The “shield” combines the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) to be launched from Aegis-equipped destroyers to intercept ballistic missiles at midcourse in space and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) to shoot down any remaining missiles. Tokyo Shimbun (evening edition), December 19, 2003; Yomiuri Shimbun, December 20, 2003. On the governmental position of the decision to introduce a “missile defense shield,” see for example, Boeicho (Japan Defense Agency), *Nihon no Boei 2004* (Defense of Japan 2004), Tokyo: Kokuritsu Insatsukyoku, 2004, pp. 335-345.

3. Newly Emerging Multilateralism in the Asia Pacific Region: The International Environment of the “Second Nuclear Diplomacy”

When the fundamental agenda setting regarding the nuclear game by the United States and North Korea and its persistence to “nuclear deterrent force” is considered, we cannot help being pessimistic about a peaceful solution of North Korean nuclear issues. Yet the biggest difference between the approach now taken by the United States and the concerned countries in the Northeast Asian region to defusing this crisis and the approach taken ten years ago lies in the channel of negotiations. When we take this new approach into consideration, we can still hold hopes for a peaceful solution of the nuclear crisis through diplomacy.

Initially, North Korea insisted on bilateral talks with the United States even when it accepted, in March 2003, the proposal of three-party talks among the United States, North Korea, and China. Pyongyang took the position that the talks were between the United States and North Korea with China that would merely play the role as a host. Encouraged by the three-party talks held in Beijing on April 23-25, the countries concerned set out to explore the possibility of holding broader multilateral talks.

The U.S.-leading Alliance Network

In this process, the United States, Japan and South Korea have closely connected so as to express the feelings that they cannot tolerate North Korea’s

possession of nuclear weapons. At the end of October 2002, the top leaders of three countries met during their visit to Mexico to join a summit of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. The three leaders also agreed that North Korea's relations with the international community now rest on its prompt and visible actions to dismantle its program to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.¹⁵ At a Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting held in Honolulu on June 13, 2003, three countries reaffirmed again that they would not tolerate North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and Japan and South Korea had vital interests at stake, which requires their participation in multilateral talk.¹⁶ Perhaps the most important result through trilateral close consultation (i.e., TCOG) is that the United States, Japan and South Korea have reaffirmed the decision to talk to North Korea while the Bush administration has officially not ruled out the possibility of economic sanction or military attack as a potential mission against North Korea.

In parallel with these approaches, interested countries stepped up their pressure on North Korea. In May 2003, the United States proposed the PSI in the form of a "coalition of the willing." The concept of the PSI originated in the Bush administration's *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* issued

¹⁵ "Joint US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Statement," *White House Press Releases and Documents*, October 26, 2002.

¹⁶ "Joint Statement of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group," *State Department Press Releases and Documents*, June 13, 2003.

in December 2002 where “interdiction” is listed first among “counter proliferation” strategies.¹⁷ After several meetings for the PSI the concerned countries came to share the principles with Paris Agreement in September 2003.¹⁸ The membership of the PSI currently comprises of fifteen nations: the United States, Japan, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Singapore and Russia. Russia has actually been involved in the process to pressure North Korea. Yet Russia at the beginning was reluctant to use these multilateral measures such as the PSI that might provoke Pyongyang, but it finally agreed to join the PSI on May 31 2004.¹⁹ Now all Group of Eight (G8) members have joined the PSI framework. Fifteen countries are the so-called core participants of the PSI, and now more than 60 nations have expressed readiness to work for it. The PSI is now becoming a “global” effort that aims at attaining preemptive interdiction, including stopping, searching, and seizing ships and aircrafts as soon as they enter any of the PSI member’s territorial waters or national airspace.

Based upon this “global” effort, the aspect of the U.S.-leading alliance has begun to change.²⁰ At the Paris meeting for the PSI in September 2003, the eleven PSI countries agreed on a set of principles laying out practical steps necessary to

¹⁷ The White House, “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January/February 2003), pp.35-38.

¹⁸ “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles,” (adopted in Paris), September 4 2003. Available at <http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/34726.htm#statement>

¹⁹ “Russia Joins Proliferation Security Initiative,” *Interfax News Service*, June 1 2004.

²⁰ Ken Jimbo, “Emerging Feature of Multilateral Security in Asia-Pacific: From ‘Double-Track’ to ‘Multi-Layered’ Mechanism,” *Global Economic Review*, Vol. 32, No. 3, (2003), pp. 95-108.

interdict shipments of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), delivery systems and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors concern. The participants also agreed at this meeting that North Korea and Iran are the “states of particular proliferation,” according to John R. Bolton, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security.²¹ Based on an agreement at the Paris meeting, the first of ten-planned multilateral exercise took place on September 13-15 in the Coral Sea on the interdiction of WMD and related materials. The chief aim of the exercises was to improve the PSI members’ capabilities to coordinate and carry out interdictions together and send a signal to potential proliferators that heightened attention was being paid to their dealings.²² As top Bush Administration officials repeatedly mentioned, the PSI is not targeted at any specific countries, but through this exercise, named *Pacific Protector*, Washington and its allies wanted Pyongyang to feel the initiative’s pinch. Walter Doran, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, said, “the United States also has begun conducting rudimentary exercises with allied nations to prepare for interdicting North Korean vessels if necessary.”²³ The *Pacific Protector*, in which Australia, the United States, Japan and France took part, was an activity of an “alliance” to block trade in WMD or their components.²⁴

²¹ Harold Kennedy, “U.S.-Led Coalition Seeks to Block Weapon Shipments,” *National Defense*, Vol. 88, Issue 602 (January 2004), pp. 35-37.

²² Wade Boese, “Interdiction Initiative to Take Shape,” *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 33, No. 8 (October 2003), p. 24.

²³ “Navy Working to Create Pacific Security Arrangement,” *Aerospace Daily*, Vol. 208, No. 3, October 3 2003.

²⁴ In June 2003, Japan domestically changed its policy in regard to the ferries operating from North Korea. Nearly 2,000 inspectors went to the port of Niigata to check for customs and

From Six-Party Talks to a Regional Security Mechanism

There is another multilateral approach regarding to this nuclear crisis could expand scope of security cooperation aside from the above U.S.-leading alliance network. U.S.-leading alliance network is originally based upon U.S. bilateral security relations or alliance with other countries (i.e., U.S.-Japan, U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Australia alliance in the Asia Pacific). The United States and its allies have begun to seek cooperating multilaterally. While the United States, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia are now expressing their hopes to expand the scope of security cooperation through six-party talks in the long run.

China has positively engaged in the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula. Some criticize that Beijing's decision came only after Washington's tough, credible insistence that other measures will be used if North Korea's nuclear weapons development cannot be ended peacefully.²⁵ And China has been North Korea's "nuclear enabler" for decades, helping Pyongyang procure nuclear technology and supplying made-in-China equipment for the North's nuclear weapons programs. In the first nuclear crisis in 1993-1994, the country China tried to persuade was not North Korea but the United States to give billions in aid to the

immigration violations, infectious diseases, and safety violations on the North Korean vessel *Man Gyong Bong-92*. North Korea responded by immediately ceasing all ferries traveling between the two countries and cancelled a port visit by an unnamed vessel believed to be involved in espionage. The Japanese policy appears to be part of a large U.S. strategy to involve regional actors in policing North Korean exports.

²⁵ John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Getting China to Support a Denuclearized North Korea," *Backgrounder* (published by the Heritage Foundation), No. 1678 (August 25, 2003), p. 1.

North without requiring Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions.

However, Beijing in this crisis made an about-face on its earlier stand and expressed its support for a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In October 2002 then-President Jiang Zemin expressed his support for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula during a meeting with U.S. President Bush in Crawford, Texas. At the end of February 2003, China toughened its attitude toward North Korea, allegedly having suspended oil shipments to the country for three days, in an effort to warn Pyongyang not to play a “nuclear card.” James Kelly, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, expressed his view that the pressure applied by China led to the holding of three-party talks in April and six-party talks in August.²⁶ It can be said that Beijing’s recent tough attitude toward Pyongyang prevents its miscalculations about intentions of the “international community” whether Pyongyang’s insistence can be acceptable. In other words, North Korea must face a pressure by the international community even if it decides to develop nuclear deterrent force to safeguard itself.

Beijing’s positive involvement into this nuclear crisis game has also enabled the concerning countries to discuss the formulation of the multilateral security framework of the Northeast Asian region where the security impact of the end of the Cold War has, so far, been less profound. Three days after the end of the first round of six-party talk in August 2003, the *China Daily (Zhongguo Shibao)* carried

²⁶ “U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar Holds Hearing on Relations with China,” *Political Transcripts by Federal Document Clearing House*, September 11, 2003.

out an article that expressed a hope to build a security framework for the Northeast Asian region in the long term based upon six-party talks.²⁷ This article indeed recognized that the road ahead of diplomatic initiatives under the six-party talks would by no means be smooth, but it expressed a hope that “comprehensive security consultation mechanism on the peninsula and throughout the region would be established. Some Chinese officials estimate setting up a “Working Group” for six-party talks as a first step for future multilateral security mechanism in the region.²⁸ It was also reported that the Chinese government was studying a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia in order to consult comprehensive security issues, such as the proliferation of WMD, the U.S. military role in the region, and territorial disputes.²⁹

The U.S. side also expresses a hope of setting up regional security dialogue built on six-party talks. On July 15 2004, at a hearing on North Korean nuclear talks of U.S. Senate Committee on foreign relations, James Kelly mentioned possibilities that the agenda for discussion at the six-party talks could be expanded in the future to include not only the nuclear weapon issues but also other serious security issues.³⁰ In South Korea, Prof. Moon Chung-in of Yonsei University who was named as chief of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asia also expressed the idea that six-party talks could be systematized as a multilateral

²⁷ Hu Xuan, “Beijing Talks Raise Hopes for Peace,” *China Daily*, August 30, 2003.

²⁸ Interview with a PLA official, Beijing, March 18, 2004.

²⁹ *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 25, 2004.

³⁰ “U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar Holds Hearing on North Korea Nuclear Talks: Committee Hearing,” *Political Transcripts by Federal Document Clearing House*, July 15, 2004.

security mechanism in Northeast Asia if North Korean nuclear issues are settled under the six-party framework.³¹

In the Japanese political arena, a possibility and necessity to establish a regional security mechanism of Northeast Asia began to be discussed. On March 4 2004, Representative Gen Nakatani, a member of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), said at the Subcommittee on Security and International Cooperation established under the Research Commission on the Constitution of the House of Representatives, "Japan should play a leading role for developing mechanism such as six-party talks on North Korean nuclear issues, creating a regional security mechanism."³² After the second round of six-party talks held at the end of February, it was reported that the Japanese government also expected that six-party talks could lead to a Northeast Asian security mechanism to discuss issues throughout the region such as the WMD and northern island disputes between Japan and Russia.³³

These stories about enhanced multilateral six-party talks are theoretically and functionally different from the U.S.-leading alliance network. Theoretically speaking, the former comprises of multilateral security cooperation (enhanced multilateralism), and the latter pertains to bilaterally-networked multilateral

³¹ *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 12, 2004.

³² *Mainichi Shimbun*, March 5 2004; "Anzenhosho oyobi kokusaikyoryoku tou ni kansuru chosa shoiinkai: dainikai (subcommittee on security and international cooperation: second meeting)," March 4 2004. Available at <http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/159-03-04ankoku.htm>

³³ *Tokyo Shimbun*, March 1 2004.

security initiatives (expanded bilateralism).³⁴ In functional terms, enhanced multilateral six-party talks is to be a diplomatic-dialogue based forum. On the other hand, the U.S.-leading alliance network has a military capability aiming at preventing and countering a specific threat (i.e., the WMD proliferation).

4. Conclusion:

Convergent of the Two Types of Multilateralism

Having been aware that North Korea preserves strong intentions to possess nuclear weapons and improves the capability to develop its nuclear weapons program, the most likely outcome must be an inclusive meeting where six nations exchange views, but no conclusive agreements are reached in near future. The key question is whether the international community as an environment of North Korea's "second nuclear diplomacy" can prevent Pyongyang from returning to its brinkmanship tactics and moving toward a more nuclear-armed nation.

In order to avoid this scenario, two trends of multilateralism must be converged on a new regionalism. In this context, the question is: what is Japan's role in converging two trends? Japan has maintained the strong bilateral alliance with the United States, while promoting multilateral security and economic

³⁴ Ken Jimbo, *op. cit.*; Brian L. Job, "Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific Region," in William Tow, Russel Trood and Toshiya Hoshino eds., *Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco System in the Asia-Pacific*, Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1997.

cooperation in the Asia Pacific. But the priority has always been given to the bilateral alliance with the United States. The significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance remains unabated, but the Japanese government should pay more attention to the nature of the significance. In the wake of a new era in which we face a less visible threat of international terrorism and the proliferation of the WMD, the Japan-U.S. alliance has to play more globally with expanding networks with other U.S. allies.

Moreover, Japan should play a leading role in engaging China to join the network. China already takes a positive and active policy to multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. But China still does not favor to participation in a U.S.-led security initiative (e.g., the PSI). China voiced concern about the *Pacific Protector* that this exercise might lead to further destabilization.³⁵ If China can show a more positive attitude to this, convergence of two trends would be better promoted. In the case of North Korea's "nuclear diplomacy," efforts to converge expanded bilateralism with enhanced multilateralism would signal a clear and strong message to Pyongyang that the international community cannot allow it to possess nuclear weapons and to return

³⁵ "China Says Concerned over High Seas Ship Search Plan," *Reuters*, September 25, 2003. See also, "'Kuosan anquan changyi' de pinggu (assessments of the PSI)," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi* (contemporary international relations), No. 10 (2003), pp. 39-48; Pang Zhongying, "Shiyiguo lanjie lianmeng: tiaozhan guojifa haishi jianli xin de quanqiu guize? (an eleven-country interception coalition: challenge to international law or creation of a new global rule?)" *Renminwang* (people's daily: www version), September 6, 2003. Available at <<http://www1.people.com.cn/GB/guojia/1030/2075348.html>>. In China some concern that Japanese military role would be expanded in the result of the PSI. See for example, "'Taipingyang baohuzhe' lianhe yanxi (Exercise Pacific Protector)," *Huanqiu junshi* (global military), No. 19 (2003).

to its brinkmanship tactics. In this context, it is high time for Japan and China at the center of expanded bilateralism and enhanced multilateralism to strengthen a strategic dialogue aiming at converging the two types of multilateralism.³⁶

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³⁶ Beijing is moving ahead to create another “enhanced multilateralism”, proposed to establish the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC) in June 2003. At an annual meeting of the ARF held in July 2004, the participating ministers endorsed the China’s proposal. The ASPC is to involve senior defense and security policy officials, so the convergent of the two types of multilateralism can be discussed by the concerning countries, especially Japan, China, and the United States at the conference.